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Abstract 
 
We examine the relative value gains between client and vendor firms following the announcement of a 
BPO deal. We posit that the gains for the vendor are higher than those of the client when clients outsource 
primary tasks with intent to access vendor capabilities and when the clients outsource peripheral tasks 
with intent to minimize costs. We also posit that the gains for the clients are higher than those of the 
vendor when the clients outsource primary tasks with intent to minimize costs and when the clients 
outsource peripheral tasks to access vendor capabilities. Using an event study methodology we examine 
221 BPO contracts between the years 2000 and 2013 to test our hypotheses. In general we found that, 
when clients outsourced with the intent to reduce costs, the vendors gained relative to the client for both 
primary and peripheral tasks. We interpret and discuss these findings and research implications. 
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Introduction 
 
Existing research on identifying the benefits of firms outsourcing their business processes is largely from 
the perspective of the client (Dos Santos et al., 1993; Hayes et al., 2000; Oh et al., 2006; Ranganathan and 
Brown, 2006) with a few scant studies exploring the vendor perspective (Levina and Ross, 2003; Madison 
et al., 2006; Nagpal et al., 2014). The BPO initiatives are largely driven by the client with the intent of 
reducing operating costs, gain efficiency or to focus on their core operations. While the gains through BPO 
have been examined largely from the client perspective such as identifying the absolute cost savings, or 
increase in operational efficiencies (Loh and Venkatraman, 1992; DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani, 1998), 
there is a gap in the research on identifying the value created for vendors in a BPO context.  
 
While outsourcing appears to be a win-win approach to both clients and vendors, studies have highlighted 
that not all outsourcing endeavors generate value for clients with some studies highlighting that only half 
the firms realized the gains out of outsourcing (Aron and Singh, 2005). This coupled with the fact that 
while a profitable proposition, BPO might not reward all vendors. Firms such as IBM exiting the customer 
management services industry and Serco Global services reporting continuous losses further this 
argument. Moreover, the fact that some clients are resorting to reversing their outsourcing decisions 
(such as JP Morgan in 2004 and General Motors in 2012) highlight the uncertainty in the industry for 
both the clients and vendors. Despite the volatility, the industry is set to grow at over 10% per annum over 
the next few years based on a survey by Deloitte. Research on outsourcing indicates that clients are the 
primary beneficiaries of the value created through outsourcing (Insinga and Werle, 2000). From the 
client’s perspective, outsourcing has traditionally been driven by cost saving initiatives (Loh and 
Venkatraman, 1992; Lacity et al., 2009).  
 
The motivation for the paper is two fold. The first is to address the gap in the literature on the vendor 
perspective. While BPO is an important phenomenon with studies have extensively explored the impact 
from the perspective of outsourcing location (Iacovou and Nakatsu, 2008), outsourcing motive 
(DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani, 1998), firm size (Grover et al., 1994), industry attributes (Oh et al., 2006), 
nature of process (Lee and Kim, 2010), firm culture (Oh et al., 2006), the impact of outsourcing 
announcement on stock prices (Loh and Venkatraman, 1992; Farag and Krishnan, 2003) and the risks 
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associated with outsourcing (Aron and Singh, 2005). All the above studies are from the perspective of the 
client with the vendor perspective, while they are subject to the same limitations, i.e., undertaking risky 
contracts, hold up issues etc. remains largely unexplored. The second motivation is that, given an 
outsourcing contract, the gains and risks associated are largely different for both the client and vendor. 
From the vendor’s perspective, beyond the obvious financial gain, firms take up outsourcing contracts to 
access client networks and to enter new domains and markets (Sen and Shiel, 2006). While there is strong 
empirical evidence to support client value gains (Loh and Venkatraman, 1992; Agrawal et al., 2006), 
similar systematic studies about vendor value gains are scant in the literature. The growth in the BPO 
industry highlights the fact that vendors too find it to be an attractive proposition for them to enter with 
significant rent generation potential. This suggests that value gains for the vendors too are likely to be 
significant. However a more nuanced question that is of interest to us in this paper are the relative value 
gains between the client and vendor and contexts in which such value gains occur. The relative gains 
perspective provides us with the advantage of comparing the impact a BPO announcement has on the 
value of both the client and vendor firms for a given contract. In addition to the above this approach 
allows us to compare the mode in which our hypothesized factors (in this case outsourcing intent and 
nature of task) impact the client and vendor firms simultaneously. 
 
The first phase of outsourcing consisted of clients moving some of their peripheral non-core tasks to 
external vendors who could perform the same task at lower costs. These vendors were able to do so by 
realizing economies of scale or through labor arbitrage by moving tasks offshore. Recent shifts in the 
industry indicate that outsourcing has moved from peripheral processes to core processes in firms such as 
research and development, logistics and supply chain services. In such contexts, in addition to the clients, 
the vendors are increasingly able to capture a larger share of the value generated out of such 
arrangements.  The factors that drive the relative values gains between the client and vendor motivate our 
study. While we expect that, in general, the gains for vendors might be positive similar to those 
experienced by the clients, our study does not consider the absolute gains or losses associated with BPO. 
This study evaluates the relative differences in the gains generated from a BPO announcement for both 
the client and the vendor and seeks to identify the factors that drive the relative difference in gains 
between the client and vendor.  Specifically we examine how the client intent in outsourcing and the 
nature of the process outsourced influence the relative value gains.  
 
We posit that the gains for the vendor are higher than those of the client when clients outsource primary 
tasks with intent to access the vendor capabilities and, when the clients outsource peripheral tasks with 
intent to minimize costs. In addition to the above, we expect the gains for the clients to be higher than 
those of the vendor when the clients outsource primary tasks with intent to minimize costs and when the 
clients outsource peripheral tasks to access the vendor capabilities. Using an event study methodology we 
examine 221 BPO contracts between the years 2000 to 2013 to test our research hypotheses. The rest of 
the paper is structured as follows; we highlight the existing research on business process outsourcing 
followed by the theoretical framework and a summary of the literature used to arrive at our hypotheses. 
The subsequent sections describe the data used, the empirical methods and the statistical analysis. The 
paper concludes with a discussion of our findings and directions for future research. 
 
Theory and Background 
 
Business Process Outsourcing 
 
Business process outsourcing has its origins in manufacturing, where firms leveraged external vendors for 
supply chain management capabilities (Tas and Sunder, 2004). It has now evolved into an industry that is 
expected to be over $200 billion by the year 2017, with firms outsourcing nearly all aspects of operations 
to external vendors. Firms outsourcing their information technology operations to firms located in or 
operated out of countries such as India and Philippines largely drove the initial impetus for the BPO 
industry. Availability of a large pool of high skilled, low cost workforce ensured that firms were able to 
obtain the required results at significantly lower costs. BPO is also seen as a precursor to knowledge 
process outsourcing, where firms are now outsourcing highly knowledge intensive tasks such as research 
and development, legal services and market research to external vendors (Mudambi and Tallman, 2010). 
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In a BPO arrangement, value is created for both the client and vendor through two mechanisms. The first, 
when there is a comparative efficiency between the stakeholders and second, when firms develop new 
capabilities. When clients outsource their operations to an external vendor, they gain by either 
minimizing operating costs or by obtaining access to a unique resource or capability to develop the best 
possible bundle of their offerings. Vendors too gain by comparative efficiencies, in this case, by 
undertaking the task for the client at lower costs or through an increase in reputation when clients seek 
them out to access a unique resource or capability. The relative gains in a BPO arrangement are a function 
of the bargaining power of the stakeholders and the potential for future rent generation through 
spillovers.  
 
The transaction cost arguments frame outsourcing as a make or buy decision (Levina and Ross, 2003; Loh 
and Venkatraman, 1992; Williamson, 1979, 1985). The resource based arguments approach outsourcing 
from the perspective that firms leverage external resources in an efficient manner to create value. We 
build on both the resource-based view and the transaction cost perspectives to identify the factors that 
drive the relative difference in gains in a BPO context. The resource-based view of the firm argues that a 
firm is able to attain a sustained competitive advantage when it is in possession of a valuable, rare, in-
imitable and non-substitutable (VRIN) resource or capability (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Thus 
when firms search for these resources beyond the boundary of the firm, they do so either due to their 
inability to develop them internally or when they can be sourced more cost effectively (Parmigiani, 2007). 
Research highlights that firm’s ability to optimally decide between the market and hierarchy to obtain the 
resource forms a critical component of the core competency of the firm (Dyer, 2000). Thus a client firm 
that outsources with intent to access vendor capability or vendor network might do so because it would be 
more efficient to obtain the same from the market than develop internally. In a similar manner when a 
client outsources with intent to access vendor capabilities, in addition to developing the best possible 
bundle of offerings, it is also signaling the vendor’s ability to acquire and hold key resources or 
capabilities. When clients outsource to an external vendor, in case of a capability driven intent, the client 
has the opportunity to learn from the vendor while the vendor gains by increasing its knowledge base and 
its reputation. When the clients outsource with the intent of cost reduction, they gain through market 
efficiencies while the vendors gain through comparative efficiencies in executing the task. Thus, we use 
outsourcing intent as one of the dimensions of the framework. 
 
One of the key challenges to buyer-supplier relationship is that of the “hold up problem” (Hart, 1995) 
which for an opportunistic partner, provides a platform to extract the most out of a given transaction.  The 
opportunistic perspective (Klein et al., 1978) determines the emphasis a vendor or a client places on the 
task outsourced in a particular contract. Research highlights the role of relative bargaining power (Coff, 
1999; Lavie, 2009), proximity in operations (Lavie, 2007) and the costs associated with opportunistic 
vendors (Das et al., 1998; Coff, 1999; Phene et al., 2014) as factors influencing appropriation of value in 
cooperative endeavors. The propensity of a stakeholder to be opportunistic is driven by the relative 
bargaining power and the potential for future rent generation due to spillovers resulting from externalities 
of the arrangement. The bargaining power in such an arrangement is largely driven by the priority the 
client places on the task as the nature of task influences the relation specific resource commitment (asset 
specificity). Thus lower levels of resource commitments could lead to firms being opportunistic. This 
mechanism has been identified as a driver of value appropriation in co-operative endeavors (Kumar, 
2008; Lavie, 2007). The other factor that could drive the relative difference in value gains is that of the 
benefits from spillovers that are accrued by the stakeholders. The extent of resource commitment and the 
priority assigned to the task by the client influences the potential for spillovers. Primary activities such as 
logistics and research and development require a significant amount of relation specific investments for 
the stakeholders and hence firms would be able to capitalize on their investments and also learn from 
each other. On the other hand, clients reaching out to specialized vendors for peripheral tasks are able to 
assemble the best possible bundle of offerings and thus obtain a competitive advantage. Thus, we use the 
nature of task, identified by the position of the task on the client’s value chain as one of the dimensions of 
the framework. The framework for our study is described below: 
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Who gains in a BPO arrangement? 
 
Outsourcing Intent 
Access to Vendor Capability Cost reduction 
Position 
of Task 
in Value 
Chain 
Primary 
Activity 
H1: When clients outsource primary 
business activities with intent to access 
the vendor capabilities, the vendor is 
likely to gain more than the client. 
H3: When clients outsource primary 
business activities with intent to 
reduce operating costs, the client is 
likely to gain more than the vendor. 
Peripheral 
Activity 
H4: When clients outsource peripheral 
business activities with intent to access 
vendor capabilities, the client is likely to 
gain more than the vendor 
H2: When clients outsource 
peripheral business activities with 
intent to reduce operating costs, the 
vendor is likely to gain more than the 
client 
Figure 1:Value Appropriation Research Framework 
 
Outsourcing Intent  
 
The intent behind outsourcing has changed as the processes outsourced have evolved from peripheral 
tasks to primary activities. Firms have moved from a focus on cost reduction to a more strategic view of 
effective resource structuring (Gray et al., 2009; Holcomb and Hitt, 2007). Studies have found that firms 
that outsourced with a cost reduction motive experienced lower gains than those that outsourced with a 
strategic intent (Farag and Krishnan, 2003). While the above studies are from the perspective of the 
client, vendors are moving from being low cost providers to being key players who are sought out for their 
skills and capabilities. This is evident from vendor firms increasingly transitioning from suppliers to that 
of strategic partners that are responsible for key tasks such as R&D and logistics management. This could 
also put the vendor in a position of strength, as it would indicate the possession of a key resource or 
capability that is valuable for the client.  
 
Position in the Value Chain 
 
We use the value chain framework developed by Porter (1985) to identify the location of the task 
outsourced based on the primary operations of the client. The core competency view of competition 
highlight that firms should be outsourcing only peripheral activities (Prahalad and Hamel, 2006). The 
knowledge-based perspective highlights that primary tasks might be subject to time compression 
diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) and could lead to firms being unable to reclaim the capability 
once moved outside the firm boundary. The other issue is the risk associated with transferring ownership 
of critical tasks as firms might be faced with opportunistic vendors (Klein et al., 1978; Hart and Moore, 
1990; Hart, 1995), which could lead to firms being held up. While outsourcing primary tasks might be 
perceived as detrimental to the firm strategy in the long run, studies have found that outsourcing primary 
activities had a greater positive impact on client firm valuation than when firms outsourced peripheral 
tasks (Duan et al., 2009). The rationale behind this finding was that the investors found outsourcing 
primary tasks being a signal of increased operational efficiency, while outsourcing peripheral tasks was 
perceived as having lesser than significant impact on the firm operations. Moreover, firms are sometimes 
incentivized to outsource core activities in part because efficient sourcing could be considered as a core-
competence of the firm (Dyer, 2000). 
 
 
Hypotheses 
 
When clients outsource primary business activities with intent to access the vendor capabilities, it affords 
the vendor with a high degree of bargaining power, as the task is key to the core operations of the client 
firm. The bargaining power is further enhanced in favor of the vendor as the opportunity for hold up is 
significantly higher for the vendor and hence vendors are able to extract premium rents in such a 
situation. In addition to the bargaining power, such an arrangement has the potential to generate 
significant rents for the vendors due to the high level of spillovers in terms of vendor learning and due to 
the task being higher up in the value chain. In addition to being exposed to the risk of an opportunistic 
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vendor, clients might face higher coordination and monitoring costs due to the proximity of the task to the 
core firm operations. Thus we hypothesize the following relationship: 
 
Hypothesis 1: When clients outsource primary business activities with intent to access the vendor 
capabilities, the vendor is likely to gain more than the client. 
 
When the clients outsource peripheral business activities with intent to minimize costs, they do so to 
eliminate the inefficiencies in managing these tasks and because it is deemed financially prudent for them 
to divert resources to primary tasks. Due to the task being peripheral in nature, the likelihood of client’s 
investing in developing superior capabilities is low and hence could explain the inefficiencies. While the 
clients experience gains in operational efficiencies post-outsourcing, the vendors could gain on two fronts. 
The first is by removing the inefficiencies of the client, which usually results in quick gains for the vendor. 
The second is through the fact that, by incurring only a marginal expense in undertaking the task due to 
their operational capabilities and due to them possessing prior infrastructural and knowledge assets 
related to the industry, the vendors can further extend their gains. Accessing a vendor for cost 
minimization would imply that the vendors are already established in the particular domain and are 
operating by leveraging on economies of scale or through labor arbitrage. Thus we hypothesize the 
following relationship: 
 
Hypothesis 2: When clients outsource peripheral business activities with intent to reduce operating 
costs, the vendor is likely to gain more than the client. 
 
In addition to the above, we explore two other relationships, these are clients outsourcing primary 
business activities with intent to minimize costs and clients outsourcing peripheral business activities 
with intent to access vendor capabilities.  
 
When a client outsources a primary activity with intent to minimize cost, they do so while possessing the 
capability to execute the task, but would be cost effective for them to obtain the same from the market 
rather than internally. This minimizes the potential of being held up by an opportunistic vendor.  This 
relationship, while accompanied with a certain degree of risk, could benefit the client in the long run as 
the client is able to effectively monitor the task due to them prepossessing the knowledge of the task and 
hence realizing cost advantages. By reaching out to an external vendor with intent to reduce costs, the 
clients also signal the ability to be financially prudent, thus providing the most value to investors. 
However, for the vendor firms, the effect might be detrimental. By taking on such a task, while signaling 
their competency to the market, the stakeholders of the vendor firm might view the vendor firm in a 
negative light due to the risk involved.  This risk stems from the fact that undertaking an outsourcing 
contract for primary activities require unique investments by the vendor, which is accompanied by a high 
degree of asset specificity. Thus we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: When clients outsource primary business activities with intent to reduce operating costs, 
the client is likely to gain more than the vendor. 
 
The second relationship is when the client outsources a peripheral task with intent to access vendor 
capability. While a peripheral task might not be considered a priority for the client, it is still a component 
of the firm’s operations and hence consumes resources that would otherwise be diverted to a primary 
task. By accessing an external vendor for its capabilities, the client now has the best possible bundle of 
resources and capabilities at its disposal that could potentially afford it a sustained competitive advantage. 
The clients also gain through positive spillovers generated by accessing a specialized vendor. In addition 
to the above, accessing a vendor for its capabilities, even for a peripheral task might improve the overall 
operating efficiency for the client and might be considered as a value enhancing proposition for the client 
in the long run. Thus we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: When clients outsource peripheral business activities with intent to access vendor 
capabilities, the client is likely to gain more than the vendor. 
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Methodology 
 
We used an event study to determine the impact of outsourcing announcements on the client and vendor 
firm value. This approach, pioneered by Brown and Warner (1985), has been used in a number of studies 
aimed towards determining the impact of an event on the firm’s stock value. The events in this case could 
be that of IT investments (Dos Santos et al., 1993); acquisitions (Chatterjee, 1986); joint venture 
announcements (Koh and Venkatraman, 1991); outsourcing service processes (Lee and Kim, 2010); 
mergers and acquisitions (Swaminathan et al., 2008). The rationale behind the event study method is that 
firm activities are perceived in a negative (value destroying) or positive (value enhancing) manner by 
investor’s and hence is reflected in them expressing their confidence or lack of it with regard to firm 
operations as indicated in the firm’s stock price. The estimation period for our study was 250 days with 
the returns obtained over a 11 day window. This approach is consistent with those used by other event 
studies on outsourcing (Oh et al., 2006; Ranganathan and Brown, 2006; Agrawal et al., 2006). 
 
The returns are calculated based on the market model which tracks the changes in the price of the stock in 
relation to that of the market index. The daily returns are obtained from the CRSP database. We estimate 
the predicted returns using the market model, obtained by regressing the firm stock returns against those 
of the market over a period leading up to the event. The return is then predicted using the equation below:  
 = 	 + 	 + 
                       (1) 
Where Rit represents the return on security i on day t, and Rmt represents the daily market return on 
the index on day t. The estimates from the market model are used to obtain the returns for the stock i 
across the event window. This is obtained using the equation below: 
 = 	 − (+	)                       (2) 
  and  are the OLS (ordinary least squares) estimates obtained by regressing Rit over Rmt across 
the estimation period (t).  We also obtain the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each firm over the 
event window. The CARs represent the sum of the abnormal returns over the window.  
 
Data and Sample 
 
Our data consists of outsourcing announcements made by large public firms in the United States between 
the years 2000 and 2013. These announcements were collected from news outlet databases such as Lexis-
Nexis, PR Newswire and Factiva. We started with an initial set of 620 announcements out of which 347 
announcements had information for the vendors. To obtain the abnormal stock returns, both the vendor 
and the client had to be listed on American stock exchanges and their data available on the CRSP (Center 
for Research in Security Prices) database. Our final sample consisted of 221 firms that fit these criteria 
and had information on the outsourcing intent and nature of task outsourced.  
 
The outsourcing intent was explicitly stated in the announcement and was coded accordingly. To 
determine the position of the task outsourced in the value chain, we used Porter’s value chain framework 
(1985, 1986) that is utilized by Duan et al., (2009) to determine if the task was a primary or a peripheral 
task. This framework describes a primary activity as those that are part of the end-to-end activities 
associated with the design, production, marketing and the delivery of the good or service to the end 
customer. Peripheral tasks are those that aid the primary tasks and include activities such as 
procurement, human resource management etc. 
 
Our data set consists of 99 announcements with intent coded as access to vendor resources or capabilities, 
122 announcements with intent coded as cost reduction. For the position of the task on the client firm’s 
value chain, 86 announcements were coded as primary tasks and 135 announcements were coded as 
peripheral tasks. To the best of our knowledge, we eliminated entries that were made in proximity to other 
announcements such as mergers or financial results to avoid confounding effects from these. 
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Results  
 
We use the approach highlighted by Johnson and Houston (2000), who examined the gains in joint 
ventures based on the motive and nature of contract. The first part of our analysis contains the absolute 
dollar amount of the abnormal returns for the clients and vendors as the dependent variable for which we 
ran ANOVAs that factored in the outsourcing intent and position of task on the value chain. We found that 
the overall model and the intent were significant for the vendor abnormal returns, but did not find 
support for the client abnormal returns. The results are summarized in Table 1 below.  
 
OBS= 221 R-Sq= 0.0365 OBS= 221 R-Sq= 0.0152
Root MSE= 1082.33 Adj R-sq= 0.0232 Root MSE= 1084.7 Adj R-sq= 0.0016
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 9631893 3 3210631 2.74 0.0442 3942352 3 1314117 1.12 0.3431
Position in VC 3779494 1 3779494 3.23 0.0739 3705991 1 3705991 3.15 0.0773
Intent 4933308 1 4933308 4.21 0.0414 14643 1 14643 0.01 0.9113
Position X Intent 1814988 1 1814988 1.55 0.216 59362 1 59362 0.05 0.8225
Residual 254200774 217 1171432 255316465 217 1176574
Total 263832666 220 1199239 259258816 220 1178449
ANOVA DV = Client CAR (-1,0)ANOVA DV = Vendor CAR (-1,0)
Table 1: Results of ANOVA on Factor Variables 
 
To identify the relative gains in BPO relationships to test our hypotheses, we ran comparative tests for the 
absolute dollar values of the client and vendor abnormal returns.  For the overall sample of client and 
vendor firms, we found that the gains for the vendor (M=152.91, SD=1095.1) were significantly higher 
than those of the client (M=-50.61, SD =1085.56), t (220)=-2.101, p<0.05. We found significant support 
for hypothesis 2 (clients outsourcing peripheral business activities with intent to access vendor 
capabilities), with the vendor (M=98.92, SD=819.98) having significantly higher gains than the client 
(M=-177.68, SD =1145.84), t (76)=-1.7675, p<0.05. For hypotheses 3 (clients outsourcing primary business 
activities with intent to reduce operating costs), we found that the results were significant, but in the 
direction opposite to the one that was proposed in the initial hypothesis. While we expected the clients to 
gain more than the vendor, we found that the gains were significantly higher for the vendors (M=555.1, 
SD=2106.888) than for the clients (M=-122.90, SD =973.92), t (44)=-1.3659, p<0.10. We did not find 
significant support for hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 4. The results are summarized in Table 2 below. In 
general we found that, when clients outsourced with intent to reduce costs, the vendors gained relative to 
the client for both primary and peripheral tasks. This signals both the ability of vendors to efficiently 
execute activities that are close to the core operations of the clients and that vendors were able to operate at 
significant cost efficiencies for peripheral tasks.  
 
Paired t-test CLIENT_CAR (-1,0) == VENDOR_CAR (-1,0) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Full sample 
Client CAR 221 -50.605 73.02294 1085.564 -194.519 93.30901 
Vendor CAR 221 152.9058 73.66426 1095.098 7.727863 298.0837 
diff 221 -203.5108 96.83818 1439.603 -394.36 -12.66155 
mean(diff) = mean(CLI_AB_CAR10 - PR_AB_CAR10) t = -2.1016 
Ho: mean(diff) = 0 degrees of freedom = 220 
Ha: mean(diff) < 0 Ha: mean(diff) != 0 Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0184 Pr( |T| > |t| ) = 0.0367 Pr(T > t) = 0.9816 
  
Paired t-test CLIENT_CAR (-1,0) == VENDOR_CAR (-1,0) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Hypothesis 2: Clients outsourcing peripheral business activities with intent to access vendor capabilities 
Client CAR 77 -177.6871 130.581 1145.844 -437.7618 82.38758 
Vendor CAR 77 98.92941 93.44566 819.9823 -87.18375 285.0426 
diff 77 -276.6165 156.5019 1373.299 -588.3171 35.08405 
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mean(diff) = mean(CLI_AB_CAR10 - PR_AB_CAR10) t = -1.7675 
Ho: mean(diff) = 0 degrees of freedom = 76 
Ha: mean(diff) < 0 Ha: mean(diff) != 0 Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0406 Pr( |T| > |t| ) = 0.0812 Pr(T > t) = 0.9594 
  
Paired t-test CLIENT_CAR (-1,0) == VENDOR_CAR (-1,0) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Hypothesis 3: Clients outsourcing primary business activities with intent to reduce operating costs 
Client CAR 45 122.902 145.1838 973.9226 -169.6967 415.5008 
Vendor CAR 45 555.1076 314.0763 2106.888 -77.87149 1188.087 
diff 45 -432.2056 316.4331 2122.698 -1069.935 205.5234 
mean(diff) = mean(CLI_AB_CAR10 - PR_AB_CAR10) t = -1.3659 
Ho: mean(diff) = 0 degrees of freedom = 44 
Ha: mean(diff) < 0 Ha: mean(diff) != 0 Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0895 Pr( |T| > |t| ) = 0.1789 Pr(T > t) = 0.9105 
Table 2: Results of Paired t-tests 
 
Discussion and Implications 
 
The key motive behind the study was to identify factors that explained the differences in the value 
generated for the client and vendor firms following the announcement of a BPO relationship. While we 
found partial support for hypotheses that were driven by cost reduction intent, we did not find support for 
ones that relied on clients outsourcing with intent to access vendor capabilities. A possible explanation for 
this could be that we did not factor in the potential for spillovers and the irreversibility in the contracts. 
When clients outsource with intent to access vendor capabilities, there could be potential spillovers that 
might influence the relative gains in the outsourcing arrangement.  Thus, while the client might reap the 
rewards in the short run, by moving a primary chain activity to an external vendor, it might be 
detrimental in the long run as they might not be able to re-learn/develop these tasks further, might lose 
out on associated innovations and could lose a valuable capability associated with the primary task. This 
could partially explain our results.  
 
While this study is one of the few that approaches outsourcing from the vendor perspective there remains 
a gap in studies on how the outsourcing industry has impacted vendor firms. A large number of firms 
from Asia have evolved from being vendors into having their own product lines and have managed to 
compete with the clients they contracted with. This coupled with the fact that there is growing dissidence 
towards the practice of outsourcing and offshoring among both, the employees of the firm and the public 
at large, the impact of potentially reduced outsourcing would also be a significant factor that could impact 
the survivability of vendor firms. Thus both client and vendor firms might have to balance the exploration 
and exploitation of their resources and capabilities to sustain themselves in the long run. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions  
 
We undertook this study to identify the factors that could influence appropriation of value that was 
generated in a business process-outsourcing endeavor.  While we strived to obtain the best possible 
explanation for this, our study does have its set of limitations.  While we did not find significant results for 
some of our hypotheses, future research could extend to include factors such as contract duration and 
account for the effect of spillovers on the value appropriation process. The second limitation is that our 
sample is limited to large public clients and vendors and to those who decided to announce the BPO 
initiative.  A large number of vendors are either small to medium scale firms that are not public or are 
located outside the United States, while these do form a significant component of the BPO industry, it is 
difficult to assess the value appropriated by these firms. While event studies provide a financial 
perspective of the value appropriation in BPO, the creation and appropriation of other value generated in 
such endeavors, such as enhanced firm capabilities or knowledge stocks would need a more thorough 
review with a deeper level of analysis to accurately determine the appropriation of value in such 
undertakings, these could be explored in future studies.  
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